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DANIEL C. RICHMAN
COOPERATING DEFENDANTS: THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PURCHASING
INFORMATION FROM SCOUNDRELS
Daniel C. Richman*
Only the most unreflective prosecutor can avoid
feeling ambivalent about cooperation. Without the
assistance of defendants willing to trade testimony
for the expectation of sentencing discounts, many
cases worth prosecuting could not be made. But if a
prosecutor maintains any distance from these
defendants -

as he must' - he is bound to be

troubled by the magnitude of the discounts that the
federal system (like other systems) gives to cooperators, many of whom rank as some of the most odious
people he has ever met.
The idea of purchasing testimony through
sentencing discounts has a long history, of course,2 as
have condemnations of those who "snitch."3 The
discounts, however, have become far more dramatic
under the federal sentencing guidelines and the
statutory mandatory minimums, whose harsh rigidity
can effectively be turned off upon a prosecutor's
certification that the defendant has rendered "substantial assistance" within the meaning of § 5K1.1 and
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).4 These discounts, whose magnitude is primarily a function of a cooperator's value to
the government, present a special challenge to a
regime committed to proportionality and to sentences
that reflect offense seriousness. Can this disruption
can be justified?
I.

The Costs of the Cooperator System
A. Sentencing Equity
From the standpoint of sentencing equity, one of
the most unfortunate aspects of any system that
rewards cooperation is that it can favor the most
culpable defendants. The "mopes" in a criminal
organization might not have much information to
trade, even were they willing to cooperate; the
kingpin or lieutenant is well placed to render
"substantial assistance," often by testifying against
criminal subordinates.' And the adverse effects of
such inequalities in the distribution of information
can be worsened when kingpins endeavor to provide
subordinates with lawyers who advise
their clients
6
against even trying to cooperate.
The role that defense attorneys play in exacerbating the inequities of our cooperation system may well
go beyond the classic "house counsel" scenario. As a
prosecutor, I often had the nagging feeling that the
chief difference between the cooperator and the non* Associate Professor,FordhamLaw School. A.B. Harvard,
1980; J.D. Yale Law School, 1984; Assistant United States
Attorney in the Southern District of New York (1987-92).

cooperating defendant was the attitude of defense
counsel to the venture - an attitude often more
reflective of the lawyer's personal predilections than
her client's interests. A lazy or overextended attorney
can push a defendant into cooperating as a way of
getting rid of the case. The attorney whose
adversarial zeal is powered by economic self-interest
may discourage clients from cooperating, striving to
develop a reputation for standing fast against the
government - a reputation that appeals to the repeatplayers who populate the high end of the market for
legal services. And the ideologically committed
lawyer can shrink from counseling an alliance with
the overpowering state. The scenarios are certainly
not inevitable, but they are all too common. Because
defendants are ill-equipped to properly assess the
risks and benefits of cooperation before they choose a
lawyer, the critical role that attorneys play in cooperation decisions presents yet another challenge to a 7
sentencing scheme aspiring to reflect moral desert.
The foregoing factors would plague any system
that gave cooperators sentencing discounts commensurate with the value of their information or testimony. The specific mechanism that the guidelines
use for rewarding cooperation, however, is in itself a
separate source of potential sentencing inequities. By
conditioning any "substantial assistance" departure
upon the government's motion, § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e)
give prosecutors a potent, perhaps even necessary,
tool for ensuring that defendants cooperate fully. But
government control over the possibility -and, to
some extent, the degree' - of such departures has
generally been exercised with an insufficient commitment to treating like defendants alike.
To be sure, many U.S. Attorney's Offices try to
promote uniformity by funnelling these issues
through a standing committee. Yet disparities remain,
both within offices and across districts -perhaps
because only the line Assistant responsible for a case
can truly assess whether a cooperator has been
forthcoming and truthful. Nor are these disparities
amenable to judicial review: In the absence of a
cooperation agreement, the government has virtually
unfettered discretion as to when or whether it moves
under § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e). 9 Where there is an
agreement, its provisions will generally leave the
government with the same extent of discretion. 10 Not
surprisingly, the government's standards for "substantial assistance" have been found to vary greatly."
And even were judges able to impose greater uniformity in such standards, they would not likely hear
about yet another aspect of disparity: the readiness of
some prosecutors to certify "substantial assistance"
where none was given, simply to allow a sympathetic
12
defendant to escape a harsh guideline sentence.
B. General Deterrence
The costs of our cooperation system are not
limited to its impairment of sentencing equity. They
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also include its effect on general deterrence. The issue
is complex: The use of cooperators does increase the3
likelihood that their accomplices will be convicted.
The lure of deep sentencing discounts may even
destabilize a criminal conspiracy before the government initiates a formal prosecution; such is the
information-forcing power of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
One must wonder at the damage done to the force of
our laws, however, when murderers "walk" because
they
were fortunate enough to have others to "rat"
14
on.

As the evocative slang suggests, the issue is not
simply one of deterrence. Our discomfort with
"snitching" runs deep. Perhaps moral opprobrium
attaches only to the "snitch," and not the government
or society that profits from his use. Yet this certainly
was not true in the days of Joseph McCarthy,'" and I
am not sure it is true today.
C. Perjury
Our discomfort may also reflect concern that the
testimony of cooperators is suspect. The risk that an
unscrupulous prosecutor will use his perceived
influence over sentencing to coerce or encourage a
cooperator to manufacture or shade testimony is
always present. Moreover, there is the perhaps
greater risk that a cooperator will independently try
to be "helpful" to a prosecutor, in hopes of greater
leniency, and that the prosecutor will not be able to
separate the truth from the "icing." The prosecutor
fully equipped to assess the truthfulness of a
cooperator's testimony would probably not have
needed to cut a deal in the first place.
To the extent that a cooperator lies, or that all
cooperators have a tendency to lie, the question of
whether we can justify the disruption to sentencing
equity and the diminution of respect for law attributable to our cooperation system might be easily
resolved. But there is no such easy answer because we
lack any hard data as to the extent of such perjury.
Defense counsel will routinely argue to juries that
snitches will say anything to curry favor with the
government, and I suspect that many lawyers actually
believe that (except when they represent a cooperator
they think deserving of leniency). Prosecutors are
convinced that, over time, their feel for cases enables
them to detect and deter cooperator perjury; and they
are confident that, should the occasion arise, they
would have the courage mid-trial to proclaim their
star witness a liar. The truth about cooperator
reliability is obviously somewhere between these
poles, but we know not where, and our ignorance on
this score is one of the most troubling aspects of
cooperation.
Certainly much truthful testimony is gained. The
question therefore becomes whether those gains
justify the costs.

II. The Benefits of the Cooperator System
To ask how important cooperator assistance is to
law enforcement raises an empirical question, but
one with moral overtones. In the first instance, this
might be taken as a question of whether we need to
be devoting so many resources (including the costs of
a disrupted sentencing scheme) to the kinds of cases
requiring cooperator testimony. I do not believe that
this is a fruitful line of inquiry, however.
The government is most likely to "purchase"
accomplice testimony where it cannot obtain equally
effective evidence from eyewitnesses, victims,
documents, and other "untainted" sources. The most
likely setting for cooperator testimony will thus be in
a case involving secretive conduct and no available
victim. Such cases are not amenable to easy classification, but they certainly include murder, corruption,
organized crime, as well as narcotics prosecutions. It
would simply be misleading to link an assessment of
the need for cooperators to the debate on the wisdom
and propriety of the "War on Drugs."
Moreover, although cases where the cooperating
kingpin gets a lower sentence than his subordinates
are troubling, the more common scenario occurs
when a criminal organization's leaders, whose
distance from street-level activity insulates them from
informants, undercovers, and surveillance, are
brought down by a cooperating witness recruited
from the lower or middle ranks of the conspiracy.
Without such testimony, the most culpable players
might never get prosecuted. The ultimate effect of
cooperation on horizontal equity is thus an open
question.
The justification of cooperators as a necessary
evil in part rests on the assumption that prosecutors
will use cooperator testimony only as a last resort.
This assumption lacks a firm empirical basis.
Doubtless, some prosecutors, out of risk aversion or
laziness, will "overbuy" - signing up cooperators
where the case would be strong enough without
them, or where additional investigative efforts could
turn up alternative sources of evidence. The problem
might not be significant were the government to
focus on the price it must pay in jury appeal when its
case rests on cooperator testimony. But prosecutors
are notoriously greedy when it comes to evidence,
and the urge to get the "inside" story of a conspiracy
for which-absent cooperator testimony-there is
only external proof, however strong, can be hard to
resist.
The "overbuying" scenario is troubling, but not a
serious challenge to the whole notion of purchasing
testimony with sentencing discounts. Such a
challenge, though, comes from those who suggest
that, rather than trade with cooperators, the government should obtain convictions, by plea or trial, and
then procure testimony through grants of immunity.
Any realistic analysis, however, shows this option to
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be illusory. As most prosecutors soon learn, compulsion orders and the threat of perjury charges are
generally not effective against a defendant who
chooses not to implicate his co-conspirators. Perjury
cases are rarely brought, hard to prove, and unlikely
to add much time tb sentences that have already been
or will be imposed for serious crimes. If truthful
information is to be obtained from criminals, it
generally must be paid for, and rarely can be coerced.
Sentencing discounts to cooperators may thus be
the only way to get critical testimony in a large class
of cases worth prosecuting. But are the discounts
unnecessarily large? If our goal is to minimize the
disruption to the guidelines' equitable goals attributable to such discounts, limiting them to the minimum
"price" that defendants would accept for their
testimony, I suspect that our prices are inflated across
the board. Yet the explanation for this may also be
related to fairness concerns. The sentences given to
cooperators can reflect not merely consideration for
testimony but also the liberation of judges from the
constraints of a sentencing regime they deem overly
harsh.16 Once again we see the clash between
individualized fairness and horizontal equity that
characterizes nearly all guideline discussions.
Could we minimize the disruption by taking
control of cooperation departures out the prosecutors'
hands? I doubt it. Perhaps judges would be more apt
than prosecutors to disingenuously certify "substantial assistance" where none was given, in order to
accommodate the especially sympathetic defendant.
But there is little basis for believing that. My own
view is that, having lived with a case longer and
having a better feel for its factual nuances, prosecutors are particularly well suited to serve as
"gatekeepers" in this area. Although defense lawyers
often speak of the risk that the government will put
words in a cooperator's mouth, I think the greater
risk is that a "cooperating" defendant will disclose as
little as possible about himself and his associates.
Prosecutors and agents are far more likely to discern
such shading and deception than are judges, but
actually proving that information was withheld can
be difficult indeed. A rule allowing a defendant to
force the governmen't to take its claim about his lack
of candor to a judge thus gives the defendant
bargaining power that serves neither the truthfinding
process nor sentencing equity.
Conclusion
I would be quite surprised if most readers agree
with all the points I have made here. Because the
exchange of cooperation for sentencing leniency is
under-regulated and never the subject of systematic
empirical investigation, the views of every actor or
former actor in the system on this issue will be based
on personal experience or anecdote. So while I think
all can agree that any system allowing such ex-

changes will undermine our commitment to a
sentencing regime based on moral desert and
proportionality, assessments of whether the benefits
from the current cooperation system justify the costs
will diverge widely.
Under the ancient English common law practice
of "approvement," an accused felon who implicated
an accomplice would win a complete pardon upon
the accomplice's conviction. 1 7 We have made some
progress in confronting the inequities of such a
system. But not much.

NOTES
'The recent unraveling of the El Rukn cases in Chicago
dramatize what can happen when a prosecution team gets
too close to its cooperating witnesses. See United States v.
1994); United States v.
Griffin, 856 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Ill.
Boyd, 833 F. Supp. 1277 (N.D.ll. 1993), aff'd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Andrews, 824 F. Supp. 1273
(N.D.Ill. 1993); United States v. Burnside, 824 F. Supp. 1215
(N.D.In. 1993).
2
See United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 599 (1878) ("The
Whiskey Cases") ("Courts of justice everywhere agree that the
established usage is that an accomplice duly admitted as a
witness in a criminal prosecution against his associates in
guilt, if he testifies fully and fairly, will not be prosecuted for
the same offense....").
'See Daniel C. Richman, CooperatingClients, 56 Ohio St.
L. J.69, 83-84 (1995); Richard C. Donnelly, JudicialControl of
Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs,60
Yale L. J.1091, 1093 (1951).
4
See Melendez v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4525 (U.S.
June 17, 1996) (government may move under § 5K1.1 for
court to depart below guideline range without necessarily
moving under § 3553(e) for departure below statutory
minimum).
5
See United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir.
1992) (characterizing this result as "inverted sentencing");
United States v. Griffin, 17 F.3d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1994)
(Bright, J., dissenting) ("What kind of criminal justice system
rewards the drug kingpin or near-kingpin who informs on
all the criminal colleagues he has recruited, but sends to
prison for years and years the least knowledgeable or
culpable conspirator, one who knows very little about the
conspiracy and is without information for the prosecutors?").
6
Richman, supra note 3, at 122-24.
This point is developed in more detail in Richman,
supra note 3.
8
Judges have been allowed considerable sentencing
discretion once the government has made its motion, see
United States v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 8, 9-10 (5th Cir. 1994)
(reversing because sentencing judge may have accepted
government's limited departure recommendation without
exercising his independent judgment and discretion); see also
Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massaro, The IllustrativeRole of
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Substantial Assistance Departures in Combatting UltraUniformity, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 799, 825-35 (1994), but they have
been counseled to give "substantial weight" "to the
government's evaluation of the extent of a defendant's
assistance," U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, cmt. n.3, and almost inevitably
will defer on such a fact-bound matter.
9
Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840 (1992).
1
See Richman, supra note 3, at 101-02. A minority of
circuits have demanded that the government act in"good
faith" where there is such a contractual provision, see id. at
103 (citing cases), but this standard still leaves the government considerable room to rationalize a dubious, or even a
bad faith, refusal to make a "substantial assistance" motion.
"1See Stanley Marcus, Substantial Assistance Motions:
What Is Really Happening?, 6 Fed. Sent. R.6-8 (1993).
12
See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of
Three Cities: An EmpiricalStudy of Chargingand Bargaining
Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 501, 531 (1992).
13
See Bruce H. Kobayashi, DeterrenceWith Multiple
Defendants: An Explanationfor "Unfair" Plea Bargains,23
Rand J. Econ. 507, 508 (1992) (arguing that leaving most
culpable defendant with lowest sentence can maximize
deterrence because increase in penalties placed on subordinates will more than outweigh any decrease in penalty of
ringleader).

"'Theeffects of cooperation on specific deterrence is
also an open question. Certainly, a cooperator will find it
difficult to return to the same criminal community that he
snitched on. However, anecdotal evidence supports the
intuition that the person who found it easy to escape severe
sanctions for serious crimes simply by cooperating will take
the risk of future prosecution more lightly.
I recall that after a defendant who cooperated in a
major narcotics case had received a comparatively light
sentence, the other Assistant on the case and I lightly told
him that we hoped he would never return to the courthouse
under such circumstances. He assured us: "You won't see
me again.... Unless it's for that white collar stuff."

"See Victor Navasky, Naming Names (1980). But see
Malachi L. Harney & John C. Cross, The Informer in Law
Enforcement 17-20 (2d ed. 1968) (former federal agents
ascribe unpopularity of informants to fact that "Communist
conspiracy [had] launched an all-out attack on the informer
as an institution").
16See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on
Departuresfrom the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 4 Fed. Sent.
R. 6 (July-Aug. 1992).
"7See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries*330; 2
Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, 226-35 (S.
Emlyn ed. 1736); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining
and Its History, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1979).

